

# Threat Report: TA505 APT Resurgence

September 1, 2020



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
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# **1 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY**

TA505 is an Advanced Persistent Threat (APT) that has been very active since at least 2014. TA505 APT is infamous for its large scale spam campaigns, which target many countries around the world and distribute different malware families. Some of the malware families that have been distributed by TA505 APT include ransomware, information stealers, banking trojans, backdoors, and remote access trojans (RAT). A summary of the main tactic of TA505 APT is shown in Figure 1.



#### Figure 1 – TA505 APT Main Tactic

The spam emails in TA505's campaigns are usually drafted to trick the victims into downloading malicious documents. The payloads are very diverse, and include:

- PDF attachments with URLs
- Direct URLs in the email body
- Malicious attachments (Microsoft Word or Excel) with macro
- .ISO contains malicious documents
- HTML attachments contain URLs.

The landing pages to download the document as well as the command and control (C2) servers are only active for a short time (usually one day) and are not accessible from the Internet the next day. This technique helps avoid static detection methods such as matching observed malicious domains and URLs.

It is worth noting that the campaigns only target Windows users as the download servers will filter and redirect the browsers to a benign website if the browsers' user agent strings are not Windows. This technique is simple but works very well to avoid distributing the malicious documents into non-targeted platforms.



Interestingly, hundreds of malicious documents delivered by TA505 APT in the latest campaigns have the same creation date. The Cysiv threat research team has also determined that the "date last saved" metadata reflects the time when the file is created by the download server, which mean the files are generated on the fly when the victim download them. The slight changes completely change the hash values of the files, while the malicious behaviours remain the same. These two characteristic make the documents polymorphic malicious documents.

The malicious macro is setup to automatically execute when the Excel workbook is opened or when macro is enabled. The macro has changed slightly between different campaigns since June 22, 2020 until the time of this report. However, their main purpose remains unchanged and that is to extract, drop, and execute a malicious downloader.

The dropped downloader is a variant of the Get2 downloader. This downloader has been used by TA505 APT to download different malware such as FlawedAmmyy, FlawedGrace, or SDBbot. This downloader can be classified based on its code and the C2 traffic it sends to the C2 servers. In the latest campaigns of TA505 APT, Get2 downloaded SDBbot RAT, the malware that has been distributed since at least 2019, has been observed.

#### **Protection Provided by Cysiv:**

Cysiv SOC-as-a-Service provides protection from a broad range of threats:

- 24x7 monitoring provides organizations with real time alerts and quick isolation and remediation to contain a threat during the early stages of an attack to prevent a compromise, data loss or breach.
- Human-led threat hunting helps to identify suspicious activity and digital footprints that are indicative of an intrusion.
- Anti-malware that may already be deployed (or can be deployed by Cysiv) on endpoints, for users, and that can be monitored as part of the Cysiv service, will constantly monitor for abnormal activities and block any connection to suspicious URLs, IPs and domains.
- Anti-malware that may already be deployed (or can be deployed by Cysiv) on servers and workloads, and that can be monitored as part of the Cysiv service, uses a variety of threat detection capabilities, notably behavioral analysis that protects against malicious scripts, injection, ransomware, memory and browser attacks related to fileless malware. Additionally, it will monitor events and quickly examines what processes or events are triggering malicious activity.
- Network security appliances that may already be deployed (or can be deployed by Cysiv) and that can be monitored as part of the Cysiv service will detect malicious attachments and URLs, and are able to identify suspicious communication over any port, and over 100 protocols. These appliances can also detect remote scripts even if they're not being downloaded in the physical endpoint.



# 2 ANALYSIS

# 2.1 Attack Vectors


### 2.1.1 LARGE SPAM CAMPAIGNS


In the latest campaigns, which happened in August 2020, TA505 APT used web links instead of attachments. The web links point to HTML pages with only a small JavaScript code (Figure 2) to redirect the victims' browser to the downloading page.



<script> window.location.href = "https://dl.river-store.com"; </script>

The human verification system's ReCAPTCA is abused by TA505 APT to avoid automated sandbox analysis (Figure 3). This technique is used to verify the victims on the landing pages before allowing download. As a result, the Excel file with malicious macro for download will not be scanned by the email filtering system.





It is worth noting that the campaigns only target Windows user as the download servers will filter and redirect the browsers to a benign website if the browsers' user agent strings are not Windows. This technique is simple but works very well to avoid distributing the malicious documents into non-targeted platforms. Figure 4 shows different responses when the user agent strings are changed.





Request	Corresponding Response					
▼ Request headers (380 B)	▼ Response headers (194 B)					
Host: dw.long-space.com User-Agent: Mozilla/S.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64; rv:77.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/77.0 Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,image/webp,*/*;q=0.8 Accept-Lonoding: gzip, deflate, br Connection: keep-alive Upgrade-Insecure-Requests: 1 Cache-Control: max-age=0	<pre>HTTP/1.1 200 OK Server: nginx/1.10.3 Date: Thu, 13 Aug 2020 15:01:42 GMT Content-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8 Transfer-Encoding: tunked Connection: keep-alive Content-Encoding: grip</pre>					
▼ Request headers (418 B)	▼ Response headers (200 B)					
Host: dw.long-space.com User-Agent: User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Ubuntu; Linux x86_64; rv:79.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/79.0 Accept: text/html.application/xhtml.xml.application/xml;q-0.9, image/webp,*/*;q=0.8 Accept-t-anguage: en-CA,en-US;q=0.7,en;q=0.3 Accept-toroiding: gzip, deflate, br Connection: keep-alive Upgrade-Inscurre-Requests: 1 Cache-Control: max-age=0, no-cache Praema: no-cache	HTTP/1.1 302 Moved Temporarily Server: nginx/1.10.3 Date: Thu, 13 Aug 2020 15:12:29 GMT Content-Type: text/html Content-Length: 161 Connection: keep-alive Location: http://www.apple.com/ios/					

#### Figure 4 - User Agent Filtering To Target Windows Users

### 2.1.2 CONTINUOUSLY UPDATING SPAM TECHNIQUES

Interestingly, the APT group has changed from using landing pages with ReCAPTCHA to using a fake OneDrive page at the end of August. The spam emails are fake OneDrive notifications (Figure 5) stating that someone has shared a file with the victims, in an attempt to trick the victims into downloading malicious Excel documents.




Figure 5 – The Spam Email, TLS Certificate, and Landing Page

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TA505 APT also keeps track of traffic on their landing pages by deploying an invisible IPLogger image to get statistics for the website traffic and to track IP addresses as well as location. Figure 6 shows an example of the HTML code embedded in one of the landing pages.

Figure 6 – Embedded Invisible IPLoger Image In Landing Pages

```
<body class="" id="RootPage.default.F.U" style="" ng-app="app" ng-controller="c1" ng-cloak > <img src="https://iplogger.org/24K4J5" style="display: none;" width=1 height=1 />
```

# 2.2 The Malicious Documents

### 2.2.1 THE COMMON CHARACTERISTICS

In order to better understand the campaigns of TA505 APT, many different malicious documents delivered in the latest campaigns have been analyzed. This helps to determine the key factors in their operations.

The first key factor to mention is the instructions to enable macro. The group always leaves messages, which asks its victims to enable the macro to see the "protected content". If the victims follow the instructions, the malicious macro will be executed. Some of the messages used by TA505 APT in the latest campaigns are shown in Figure 7.

Display of the second	Office     Defice     Defice	Control Contro
Microsoft         Document created sating the application not related to Microsoft Office           Visit Source         Source         Source           Visit Weingording, prime the bilinging stage:         Source         Source           Click table adding inter from the plane to adure         Document created of this processing flags	Compared to the probability of the probability	
ENABLE CONTENT This document was inserted in an avefore version of Morpash Dock. Program enable folling and Cantexet to see this document. Caref value? Influence the steps back (If you downloaded this document this representation of the return of the protocol for protected documents. If you downloaded this document this your email, plasse citie "reade intege" from the yellow law above. One you take mailed editing, please M. "Enable Contern" on the yellow law above.	3. Once you have enabled edding, please clock Enable Content from the yollow bar above. CONTENT OF THIS DOCUMENT IS PROTECTED PLEASE ENABLE EDITING AND THEN ENABLE CONTENT LOADING	To singulary the content of the discussed content, where allow adding and content Invoice # 2.38 ISBN721 Date : 60/000 Company Name : Email: POE: 6100706721

Figure 7 – Different Instructions To Enable The Malicious Macro



Once the macro is enabled, it will show a message box to ask the victim to "Please wait while Windows configures Microsoft Office 64-bit Component 2013" to make sure the macro will have enough time to drop and execute malicious downloaders in the background.

Origin ——	
Authors	
Last saved by	Administrator
Revision number	
Version number	
Program name	Microsoft Excel
Company	
Manager	
Content created	6/22/2020 10:41 AM
Date last saved	8/20/2020 1:50 PM

Interestingly, hundreds of malicious documents delivered by TA505 APT in the latest campaigns have the same creation date (Note: the time zone is UTC) shown in Figure 8. The Cysiv threat research team has determined that the "Date last saved" metadata reflects the time when the file is created by the download server, which mean the files are generated on the fly when the victim downloads them.

The instruction messages to enable the macro in the document are also changed every minute, even if victims download the file from the same URL. These slight changes completely change the hash values of the files, while the malicious behaviours remain the same. These two characteristics make the documents polymorphic malicious documents.

### 2.2.2 OBSERVED MALICIOUS DOCUMENTS

As mentioned in the previous section, all the malicious documents in the latest TA505 campaigns share the same creation date, which is June 22, 2020. Upon further analysis, it's been determined that the campaigns started since June of this year use very similar malicious macros and dropped payloads.

Figure 9 lists some of the observed file names of the malicious documents delivered by TA505 APT. Note that some index numbers in the names can be different. This shows that the group is trying to target different groups of victims in a very short period of time.



Time	Delivered File Names
June 2020	2020_06_22_harvest_expense_report.xls, 457_the peoples_pension (01- oct-19 to 31-may-20) (set 3).xls, Certificate_2451.xls, MF0620-58.xls, HDFC ENET-R1596.xls, Form F-23531.xls, CHQ724215999.xls, Scan_427075372.xls, Payment Data.xls
July 2020	CH039648_181.xls, FACA0000300085048.xls, Imagen_(704).xls, 324_The Peoples_Pension (01-Oct-19 to 31-May-20) (Set 3).xls
August 2020	CHQ120221061.xls, 06-08-2020-083-CRA.xls, AR0508_87.xls, 850_The Peoples Pension (01-Oct-19 to 31-Jul-20).xls, Aug 2020-87 Corp.xls, FDAS082020-01.xls, REVISED Privacy Policy.xls, Corrected PO38051 – AUG2020.xls, Registration Form_EXHIBITOR_0942.xls

## 2.3 Malicious Macro

The malicious macro is setup to automatically execute when the Excel workbook is opened or when the macro is enabled. The macro changes slightly between different campaigns between June 22, 2020 and the time of writing this report. However, their main purpose remains unchanged and that is to extract, drop and execute a malicious downloader.

### 2.3.1 COMMON EXECUTION FLOW

All of the malicious macros delivered in TA505 APT's campaigns have been observed by the Cysiv threat research team to have the following execution flow:

- 1. The macro firstly copies the active Excel workbook to the %TEMP% folder by using ActiveWorkbook.SaveAs Excel method. The destination file names might be changed in different campaigns. Some of the observed names are "doreal.xlsx" or "academl.xlsx".
- 2. It will then copy the file mentioned in the previous step and save it in the same folder by using FileCopy VBA function. The destination file name is the source file name plus the extension ".zip". For example "doreal.xlsx.zip" or "academl.xlsx.zip".
- 3. The object "oleObject1.bin" is then extracted from the .zip file generated in the previous step and saved to %TEMP% folder under the file name "oleObject1.bin".
- 4. The macro will then extract 2 DLLs from the oleObject1.bin file and drops them in the folder "%AppData%\Roaming\Microsoft\Windows\Templates". Examining the file oleObject1.bin further, it's apparent that a Facebook icon is embedded in it. The icon can be viewed in an image viewer application like any other regular image. However, the image contains two DLLs inside of it as shown in Figure 10.



Figure 10 – Hidden DLL

	Offset(h)	00	01	02	03	04	05	06	07	08	09	OA	0B	0C	OD	0E	OF	Decoded text
	00000000	89	50	4E	47	OD	OA	1A	OA	00	00	00	OD	49	48	44	52	*PNGIHDR
	00000010	00	00	00	20	00	00	00	20	08	02	00	00	00	FC	18	ED	ü.i
	00000020	A3	00	00	00	19	74	45	58	74	53	6F	66	74	77	61	72	£tEXtSoftwar
	00000030	65	00	41	64	6F	62	65	20	49	6D	61	67	65	52	65	61	e.Adobe ImageRea
	00000040	64	79	71	C9	65	30	00	00	00	AB	49	44	41	54	78	DA	dyqÉe<«IDATxÚ
	00000050	62	74	8A	5D	C5	40	4B	CO	C4	40	63	30	6A	01	41	CO	btŠ]Å@KÀÄ@c0j.AÀ
	00000060	42	86	1E	lE	2E	56	65	79	01	80	FB	E2	F5	D7	54	B3	BtVeyūâo×T*
	00000070	CO	DA	58	3A	3E	50	4B	59	4E	00	59	DO	39	6E	35	75	ÀÚX:>PKYN.YÐ9n5u
	00000080	2C	DO	D7	14	6D	CA	B7	A2	61	1C	64	47	1B	DO	36	OE	,Đ×.mÊ ca.dG.Đ6.
	00000090	90	43	E6	CB	B7	DF	5D	<b>B</b> 3	4F	1F	3D	FB	94	56	A9	E8	.CæË B] O.=û"V©è
	000000A0	EE	A3	OF	44	9A	3E	38	92	29	30	7A	31	93	29	44	FO	1£.D3>8')0z1")D8
	000000B0	CB	D7	DF	40	DF	EO	D7	CE	48	BO	BO	DB	BB	28	14	97	Ë×B@Bà×ÎH°°Û»(
	00000000	D4	C5	18	AF	8B	DA	OE	DO	30	88	5E	BC	FE	4A	DB	38	ÔÅ. ~ (Ú.Đ0^^4) JÛ8
	00000000	78	F9	E6	18	15	E2	00	92	57	91	03	SA	98	90	19	2D	xùæâ.'W'.Š~
	000000E0	AE	47	2D	18	<b>B</b> 5	60	30	56	FA	04	EB	DE	Dl	38	18	Cl	@Gµ`OVú.ĕ₽Ñ8.Á
	000000F0	16	00	04	18	00	BA	40	32	E3	AF	AB	08	4D	00	00	00	°@2ā «.M
	00000100	00	49	45	4E	44	AE	42	60	82	4D	5A	90	00	03	00	00	.IEND®B`,MZ
No.	00000110	00	04	00	00	00	FF	FF	00	00	B8	00	00	00	00	00	00	·····ÿÿ,
and the second	00000120	00	40	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	. @
	00000130	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	
	00000140	00	00	00	00	00	FO	00	00	00	0E	1F	BA	OE	00	B4	09	·····ð····°··`·
	00000150	CD	21	BS	01	4C	CD	21	54	68	69	73	20	70	72	6F	67	1!L1!This prog
	00000160	72	61	6D	20	63	61	6E	6E	6F	74	20	62	65	20	72	75	ram cannot be ru
	00000170	6E	20	69	6E	20	44	4E	53	20	6D	6F	64	65	2E	0D	OD	n in DOS mode
	00000180	OA	24	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	B3	BO	2E	94	E7	D1	40	.ş

5. The 2 DLLs are the same malware, but are compiled for x86 and x64 architectures. TA505 APT deliveries the two different DLLs to make sure that it can be executed on the two main CPU architectures. The macro will call the ExecuteExcel4Macro VBA function to execute the Excel method CALL, which will execute the DLL function (Figure 11). The macro will exit when the fist DLL function call is executed successfully.





### 2.3.2 OBSERVED DLL FUNCTION CALLS

In the next section, the dropped DLLs are shown to be packed to hide the exported DLL functions. A list of DLL function names called by the malicious macro in the TA505's campaigns since June 22, 2020 has been compiled (Figure 12). Note that the list is not exhaustive.



Date observed	DLL function called by macro
22/06/2020	ExecuteExcel4Macro("CALL(" + sOfbl & """,""mamed"",""J"")")
23/06/2020	ExecuteExcel4Macro("CALL(" + sOfbl & """,""" + " <b>nake1</b> "",""J"")")
24/06/2020	ExecuteExcel4Macro("CALL(" + sOfbl & """,""" + "fruudt"",""J"")")
25/06/2020	ExecuteExcel4Macro("CALL(" + sOfbl & """,""" + "vckpmd"",""J"")")
26/06/2020	xecuteExcel4Macro("CALL(" + sOfbl & """,""" + " <b>vufvuf</b> "",""J"")")
03/07/2020	ExecuteExcel4Macro("CALL(" + sOfbl + "ginum"",""J"")")
06/07/2020	ExecuteExcel4Macro("CALL(" + sOfbl + "goldman"",""J"")")
05/08/2020	ExecuteExcel4Macro("CALL(" + sOfbl + " <mark>pixi</mark> "",""J"")")
06/08/2020	ExecuteExcel4Macro("CALL(" + sOfbl + "veni"",""J"")")
07/08/2020	ExecuteExcel4Macro("CALL(" + sOfbl + "dipo"",""J"")")
12/08/2020	ExecuteExcel4Macro("CAL" + "L(" + sOfbl + " <mark>disssl</mark> "",""J"")")
13/08/2020	ExecuteExcel4Macro("CAL" + "L(" + sOfbl + "belo"",""J"")")
20/08/2020	CallByName(ExcelC, "Execu" + "teE" + "xcel4Macro", VbMethod, "CAL" + "L(" + sOfbl + "brust"",""J"")")
25/08/2020	CallByName(ExcelC, "Execu" + "teE" + "xcel4Macro", VbMethod, "CAL" + "L(" + sOfbl + "frar"",""J"")")

#### Figure 12 – List of Observed DLL Functions

# 2.4 The Malicious Dynamic Link Libraries

### 2.4.1 CODE CERTIFICATES

The main purpose of a code signing certificate is to help end-users verify the authenticity of a software. A signed application includes a signature, company name, and a timestamp if desired. A valid code signing certificate will prevent warning messages at installation or start-up of the program. This is a security feature that malware developers abuse to trick their victims. In most cases, malware authors use stolen certificates to sign their malware or even register for certificates for their uses.

The Cysiv threat research team has observed different code signing certificates (Figure 13) being used to sign the malicious DLLs delivered by TA505 APT in the latest campaigns. One of the common characteristics of the signed certificates is that they have very odd valid time.



ners		Signers	
- INFINITE PROG	RAMMING LIMITED	<ul> <li>Everything Wow s</li> </ul>	.f.0.
Name	INFINITE PROGRAMMING LIMITED	Name	Everything Wow s.r.o.
Status	Valid	Status	Valid
Issuer	Sectigo RSA Code Signing CA	Issuer	Sectigo RSA Code Signing CA
Valid From	05:19 PM 08/23/2020	Valid From	01:12 AM 08/25/2020
Valid To	05:19 PM 08/23/2020	Valid To	01:12 AM 08/25/2020
Valid Usage	Code Signing	Valid Usage	Code Signing
Algorithm	sha256RSA	Algorithm	sha256RSA
Thumbprint	Thumbprint 7239764D40118FC1574A0AF77A34E369971DDF6D		C1E5574C891683C1FA811105049DCB67993F527E
Serial Numbe		Serial Number	49 29 AB 56 1C 81 2A F9 3D DB 97 58 B5 45 F5 46

#### Figure 13 – Signed Malicious DLLs

### 2.4.2 EXPORTED FUNCTIONS

As mentioned earlier in this report, the functions called in the macro are not listed in the export table since the DLL is packed. Figure 14 lists all exported functions in one of the packed DLLs. It is worth mentioning that the two functions have the same relative virtual offset (RVA).

Figure 14 – List of Exported Functions in a Packed DLLs

Exported Functions [ 2 entries ]										
Offset	Ordinal	Function RVA	Name RVA	Name						
6528	1	25C0	7D46	StimXInit						
652C	2	25C0	7D50	StimXTest						

These exported functions are misleading as they do not do anything suspicious (Figure 15). However, it's now known that these are not the function being called in the macro as analyzed in the previous sections.

Figure 15 – An Exported Function In A Packed DLL

10: StimXInit ()	;
push ebp	
mov ebp, esp	
push ecx	
xor eax, eax	
mov esp, ebp	
pop ebp	
ret	

After unpacking the DLLs, the functions being called in the macro become apparent. The function profiled in Figure 16 is an example. This function is analyzed in the next section to reveal its malicious behaviours.





Exported Functions [1 entry]					
Offset	Ordinal	Function RVA	Name RVA	Name	
34A28	1	1070	36448	pixi	

### 2.4.3 GET2 COMMAND AND CONTROL TRAFFIC

The unpacked DLL is a variant of Get2 downloader. This downloader has been used by TA505 APT to download different malware such as FlawedAmmyy, FlawedGrace, or SDBbot. This downloader can be classified from its code base and the C2 traffic it sends to the C2 servers.

Get2 downloader first prepares the user agent (Figure 17) and the victim's computer name and user name by using the APIs GetComputerNameExW and GetUserNameW respectively. Running processes are also enumerated for the C2 checking request.





The C2 URL is hard-coded in the sample as shown in Figure 18. In the latest campaigns, the C2 URLs could be changed in different campaigns to avoid detection.

Figure 18 – An Example of C2 URL



The sample will then send an HTTP post request with a URL-encoded payload contains:



#### **&D=<Computer name>&U=<Username>&OSA=<Windows Architecture>&PR=<Pipedelimited process list>** to the C2 server for checking and request the URLs to download the next stage payloads. Since Get2 is a downloader, it can download different malware requested by the C2 server. In the latest campaigns of TA505 APT, we observed Get2 downloaded SDBbot RAT - the malware that has been distributed since at least 2019.





# **3 REFERENCES**

Note: A comma-separated values (.csv) file of more IOCs is available separately.

012911cad47bedff2a59793ab74aabd3dbbc7220ee80659a7817083d160b6785 02ec074f0269a8c818c9c7909b0a199ef6eda4e345e2b1517d09244fe4ab7dd9 05b8f362ea7e9a835277e1260f61b13d145222e30ca8990a629efde8dd08d138 06c0ab8a6bc1282c8247fc321dd1368597d65e70f7a893c86f5a6cff09e3150c 07334f36bdbb4242273fc4e5e40671d689b5f633b5fe7a1334ba4359b84739ff 07a93142246512c2794ef75195eb1b3d6f1c9ce6413a66d01bdf07f2193d6992 087a903b1906e97d93c6cc502f4c80711758239efd313b2f4f4297263555b5eb 0915a4a74eee5058bb177692465c56cce4353519f8b362caa78ddfea2f5ef3ac 0aecd1f43c29578fb6bb4e4b865e1451e83a9bdf69b82fa2a4aa55a806686796 0c688ee9f0aa15aa59e9d3508c9dc2e1c746035be08e49e79132f7c04d05ed46 2b5d944d516465f7fdce7aa2be01922ccb69ffb28f7019ac1f1d9ed694aa8209 2b5dc1360c78baaffc4c2a0990210bd7db96de4830241923c2f42a858ed6e95b 2c4f5e0cd52810f7bc51ca2faa4b1204a221db21a3ca8058890485378d8332aa 2fc85ee2c3660e01f445e465231c26e5c2f7e655f0f0e75a186a6db92c485cb9 3040beaf2c54670afec47e3f73e78229f972a707e93b289b8d1a698c14dec691 320bd47089676371717c90dfa1592ed78a88beb86574cdd294533f51d0c04e02 33a7f6956b7b24cc4af5c09695471b46c6c809cc7b9af1329890e87ba4374226 368727538e627023666f7ab21bff3554e6c9a33ae891151c126fa505800ea06f 36eed2086307f7c6dc261aa714888bc4e3f8e0e2c17ba35addf9df400fff33e7 374e477088919d46184060c002e33677284579535b96ced6c89e3706194680e6 375953d5ce5d27208ad17ff99af07942539ed01efe03393953b7ce11a98732c8 3805288ae8dd21cec636b02037cfeace6e03fd4c0c290c8a4b12cf8e50410772 3aaf3bf2e29dac283b44acea2ff93929d5315646a31a4a5b5ea4db07ecd5cd90 3be099019084b985ef1ad350956900f0fd83547e3b2a42986fa1223cbf2ad3a0 3bf578663a52bf3a5727f968f76ff2352f0fe07ce629112937d06b10e487cb6b 3c74a24d160bd62ae89eaf502044e95e193acbb785f6db3256ed3f48a7245dc4 3ef148a90eea00cfea4fa34b3366a4b25a8b3c95f4a64bbd4cdc75be9bdd3fb4 40ccc834a3148a466bbe60c01a6212db6799a8c9137d9b14956007138a6dbd5d 40f6cceeea9fa1544e35f625e8a50a39c845177b323374f5e7cde0e6506fdba4 41624ae623e2af7bbb568599ad61631bd62458e1909dd4d86b603968aba73d95 432ed56115569228873c91642f15f62cd241cd60dff576a9e425259b904ea639 437db0598ec410bd5db166ca5611fd3a1b67320fc7ddcf070c36cd75bb8725ec 46493963dbd60e7ce1d07af11a48a7684f37af63d8ba9da71ff91601c89f3d43 471231de725f4c7aaa1130b8dfd69dfb67cdef23a10bd80040eb7fd0a6c2cead 4df6b7cd5398387adb2bf5f1b63c9f7f8f0f5e1ed1c4a748a5159bcec0ecadde 4eea8fccc29df6694bcf7693f23cc23550d533ac4e6fb0442ebe98561bcb3fc8 5b5ea62e723b74ddcdc705818956e58997a244edfa265756ef3dd79b57e58491 5c46b69a8f36f88ecce8f7d895d807f54e7b42bdb6e91d79f015f179e1d9f117 5dd15b01fa038808f67cd8c70b9788faf46909d4e66fccbf50af300f425bfc11 5e810ad1f22130ae0309165437801a4e8c2c1928c432c4cb653521b1257f8df2 66159933a159971016ec29086bda1a51aaa8e3221830e43b2391fc261427459a 66da26f9df31fdcf861bc66e3396b78704bff1609795951818275b51dc48cfa9 6b18a4c322f77c3da6c6b8018165eb54e10bccf3a834cd708a512aa15d19c448 6c9b0fefb83688311d0beef6706f0e69f4fd984f607c675cba4cee57dde91d9f 6dc8c812869ac0dd282a7c08cc11cb98c997394644c3f849964d05448b1e4205 6f2ac8411d980d4916c4de6862d0afc565cbbfee701c03d34ff9b19cbf57391b 70600426435c0bcac757d917476347af954b3ce0066c102f03dddb349fbfd6ae 73e4b9457e6c67ebec7c6e5817bb48848255eb7f75930a7b7728a247a0db03ac 745dbc0519510d311206e863895ee2afe93a843a9e6edfdf428079040047f28a 7c74be42a6e58752dc9c99be9d95dd85961c2dcbd08787697fd81360c8e67681

7c8f49a71887be9e3584490aeaeb501b7f5cd8861a0fffc1ad5f084fab9f1f53 7e14da3bfbb503a149e454902dc2ef477be29b069ccef4a07b5f185cfd1cd406 7f0d0ee334f09f222a6cadc5df94231154bf1f474788dede556ce72d6464dab8 8111b18ed6841dd7f82bbbde1c855969fa7936243bca3df2ae9987949391befc 852d5a3d57834cae80089b5dccf1a4a1ccead2bbae728041a6a6b4590bf34a51 86bda2fb84d57168bb9b745abb75ac6e7885659927acedfa28110e14d066ed1f 884743629b0b9040016c5a24275427bdc7f764fbfbf37838bc2b582a15e0aedf 89af37d0ca9d1d843e244fb937d2736deb56c7c1f7368e4fc81207579433b030 8d1d865fb1315462050db3f60c0bf06616d78d833be3f5f595cd841e4612346c 9d8cdb5b6f281dd804e36a9460bd3a7ba4e4bc1ff940593614e67b44c3f654a0 9db8f196a41254b4215ae69b6ade5be9b26001b75810e76f75c2379cb3fc1477 a01255cc1c8f12405ad04b3d6a51bb593653f1c3af90f45d998966bad3feefd1 a21a60b4ba2441ba489bdfe75161cb6a458e8e76aff7f66cffa186193a3cb9f1 a27096812d47461059757dae41c7d47867366c258338f035440bf02396bb07ac a3d7dde872b4e45ec8a4332894363fb61590f5a283386ef74b5c4de3ddecb253 a5053faa0a485252a923c4a9ea9c6a84942bfab4f4d54c263b460489490e908c ac4ce9060a9e1f662e656343bdcde2781b84afd7decf216c5a5c0a8064e25d2f ac58de9e9b8240f8f3c56ef3c5dca52aa32713c9fa5f3258f687415a335454f2 ad91f6bc3e471074ee6f18d4508bb10ae38f346c6e30e4e6962dcf921baa80fb ade1ef53a78e869c6c07577c4199733ca7fca9664819a4a5d2a37a92c1005642 b09dc67b5c8ee6fc8a65da93ceede3bd880aa8305fad437361eb44dc0b2bc399 b1cfd33780e7ed972b263817b1d236837e651e9228fd1192498b9d70e63f6121 h1eff8db891b80d133f08ccb67614c7fab2e8ced813bd4729cc73fb89038b76c b21b711d2a3aaad620b09c22b934fe0e7218477371d861ce99cad076a0335f85 b2458809631df7a780e7b8a02e60bcbeca7735d635a551d04042cf728fa50b68 h3f83f3a2c0f7a7fbb89036584eea8712cba331e916a357f66e7a1f14f3607b2 b41bcc414ff6de1051ea8bd0779c0967660dd8c0acbbac713e78295fb767631e b7b83143a8af8d6998c0423933295ec42f78b27c377bc5dd403574ca82732b1b b7f4ef753813787c3cffaa672867a53b8a070a339de76d505f397504746a723c b85971a7613f96948b5279aa7f4becea0f5b96e3cf02994c4cf19a6fa8c04fdc bc759a078d4c3e5edf5660db9b8147d69669d2093e4b1f929223c468e777d148 bcacef9bb0953a6244e6d305391bd68885cca488e06d613041345aa7feded1be bee0c123b415d14e3556ebf01c56ca38dd3a4fbacea264bc4c0876eb70d97dd7 c1e8a6532f09a9e938471d134ce666b2b8b45caf4b0753e90c9e12c23fa3aaa6 c4636702a81c99435ae63b7872d9d5934cdf36c2f4be6091bb0bb5fb8b246a5e c78ed20328aed1a9c722b1f5b5ffbbac1c994e8205ca0f25656bfb9e928f9995 c92d166240dd5779ef79e6a367b2dd1764b540803c627cb074bd53a9fd973cc8 d003ffc1920f3f02c2f86eca565468b43608263c2bbb0e37af2fde12c2d2d1fb d053d2dd5a705c83b95722aa000d5dfb61f7ec9770d4ac7f1f8756f08a0de751 d40d9ad048a00fefc090a90b50c16a647c56774c76f56f991b5d748a697abeda d47cfcd934e2b2e6f8beb8030e0d48909aa7d6a2d906ba71a8043b02e0aa41aa d6ede39ce06c0ec47678633c0aa1942a2ac7c233da11bb9bb12212a71cd59010 e62cbd4da8fe7e96f0ffbaf983ccee828393f4eefbaf9641f26b9c86c137a19b f33046a66b42d2f8192cf2abe8d2152be24c0135392c978a4ccc1c3f621807ac f4a0b9bd169315736e53a538b6176db3e9c1a5c0dd2d1224286cac899ff3755e f9509f152d292da195f3e2b18e5d80f1be7dfaaa9e1715a566e9f6a60b31d8cb fc6dbeaca572167307caa243fc1512ccb7129ace3a66f48baf597905e8e24ea6 fe53cbb3be53632aac13101a8de8d704c1bf582ab6ea4c19033a7163f2342155 fe5baa36d7a588d70fcf42d541bb92127002b3556ddddacfcb4951066155e530 fe7c2e01ce0693b4f67beed1fcf3cc07f67035a2f7a8e67b26c11f314eb7741f

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